SAT-based Model Checking of Train Control Software.

Phillip James Markus Roggenbach

Department of Computer Science Swansea University, United Kingdom

CALCO-jnr'09

In co-operation with Invensys.



- Verification Within The Railway Domain.
- Reachable State Algorithms.
- Real World Interlockings.

Verification Within The Railway Domain Our Approach Real World Interlockings Real World Interlockings

Verification Within The Railway Domain

Motivation

Metro-link passenger train collides with freight train. Los Angeles – Sept 2008.

Railways




25 people killed, over 100 people injured.

Phillip James Verifying Train Control Software

Interlockings

Railways Kanso's Verification Project Aims


A major system responsible for ensuring safety within the railway is the interlocking system.



- Interlockings control aspects such as signals and points.
- Interlockings are written by Invensys in a logic similar to propositional logic.

Railways Kanso's Verification Project Aims

Railway Verification in Propositional Logic – Kanso 2008



Railways Kanso's Verification Project Aims


Discussion of Kanso'08

Positive:

• Successful verification of some safety properties of a real interlocking.

Problematic:

• Unclear: Is a violation reachable?



• Costly human interaction required.

Verification Within The Railway Domain Our Approach Real World Interlockings Railways Project Aims

Our Aims

- If a counterexample is found, produce an error trace to the counterexample.
- Devise a verification method which ignores unreachable states.
- Implement these techniques into a useable verification tool which works on real world interlockings.

Our Approach

Reachability Algorithms Knowing when to stop?

SAT-based Model Checking

k-bounded Model Checking

$$\begin{array}{l} i \leftarrow 0 \\ B_0 \leftarrow \{\mu \mid I(\mu)\} \\ \text{while } i \leq k \text{ do} \\ & \text{ for } \mu \in B_i, \text{ if } \neg(\varphi(\mu)) \in SAT \text{ return "unsafe" } + \text{ trace; stop} \\ & B_{i+1} \leftarrow \{\mu' \mid T(\mu, \mu'), \ \mu \in B_i\} \\ & i \leftarrow i+1 \\ \text{ return "safe"} \end{array}$$

Unbounded Model Checking

```
Change i \leq k to B_{i+1} \subseteq B_0 \cup \cdots \cup B_i.
```

Reachability Algorithms Knowing when to stop?

Some Definitions

Definition: Series of transitions.

We define a series of *n* transitions T_n in an automaton as follows:

$$T_n = \bigwedge_{0 \le i \le n-1} T(S_i, S_{i+1})$$

where $T(S_i, S_{i+1})$ is a transition from state S_i to state S_{i+1} .

Formula size: O(kn), k number of rungs, n number of iterations.

Knowing when to stop?

Definition: Inclusion Property

We define an inclusion check as:

$$P = I_n \land T_{n+1} \Rightarrow (LF_n \Rightarrow \bigvee_{i \leq n+1} S_{n+1} \Leftrightarrow S_i)$$

If $P \Leftrightarrow true$ then inclusion has been reached.

Definition: Loop Freedom

An Automaton A is loop free for n transitions if the following holds:

$$LF_n = T_n \land \bigwedge_{0 \le i \le j \le n-1} \neg (S_i = S_j)$$

Formula size: $O(kn^2)$, k number of rungs, n number of iterations.

Verification Within The Railway Domain Our Approach Real World Interlockings Verification Results

Real World Interlockings

Real World Interlocking

Problem size:

- Ladder Logic for small train station about 550 variables.
- 1 iteration = (approx) 1 second of run-time.

Experiments:

- Without inclusion:
 - Only 500 iterations possible due to state space explosion.
 - Verification time 523(s), more iterations: out of memory.
- With inclusion:
 - Only 50 iterations possible due to large formulae.
 - Verification time 652(s), more iterations: out of memory.

Slicing needed!

Verification Within The Railway Domain Our Approach Real World Interlockings Verification Results

Program Slicing

Main Idea: Construct a program slice by removing variables/rungs which have no effect on the safety condition.

- Algorithm thanks to Fokking et al.
- New correctness statement and proof:

consider reachable states only!

Program Slicing Example

Slicing a ladder with regard to a safety condition:

 $(tlag1 \lor tlar1) \land \neg(tlag1 \land tlar1) \land (tlbg1 \lor tlbr1) \land \neg(tlbg1 \land tlbr1).$

```
1 while(true){
2 crossing1 = (req0 && ...
3 req1 = (pressed0 && ...
4 tlag1 = ((not crossing1) ...
5 tlbg1 = ((not crossing1) ...
6 tlar1 = crossing1;
7 tlbr1 = crossing1;
8 plag1 = crossing1;
9 plbg1 = crossing1;
10 plar1 = (not crossing1);
11 plbr1 = (not crossing1);
12 audio1 = crossing1;
13 }
```

```
1 while(true){
2 crossing1 = (req0 && ...
3 req1 = (pressed0 && ...
4 tlag1 = ((not crossing1) ...
5 tlbg1 = ((not crossing1) ...
6 tlar1 = crossing1;
7 tlbr1 = crossing1;
8 }
```

Figure: Sliced Ladder

Figure: Original Ladder

Experiments Dealing With State Space Explosion Verification Results

Correctness Theorem

Theorem:

Given a ladder logic program ${\it P}$ and a safety condition $\varphi,$

$$A(P) \models \varphi \Leftrightarrow A(P|_{\varphi}) \models \varphi.$$

Proof Sketch: Argue on reachability of states in each automaton.

Implementation of slicing in Haskell.

Verification Within The Railway Domain Our Approach Real World Interlockings Verification Results

Program Slicing – Some Results

Our Results on Real World Interlockings:

- Ladder with approx 550 variables reduced to ladder with 62 variables.
- Without Inclusion:
 - Up to 2000 iterations 4553(s), more iterations: out of memory.
- With Inclusion:
 - Up to 200 iteration 1554(s), more iterations: out of memory.

Underlying prover: Equinox.

Commercial Tool: about 100 iterations.

Overall Verification Results

k-bounded Model Checking:

Property	Kanso'08	k-bounded MC
φ_1	Safe	Safe
φ_2	Unsafe	Counterexample (4 iterations)
φ_3	Unsafe	Counterexample (3 iterations)
φ_4	Unsafe	Counterexample (1 iteration)

Unbounded Model Checking:

- Inclusion not reached in 200 iterations.
- Current slices: \sim 60 variables.
- Experiments show: \sim 30 variables work out.

Verification Within The Railway Domain	
Our Approach	
Real World Interlockings	Verification Results

Conclusion

Summary

- New slicing Theorem w.r.t. reachable states only.
- Slicing works very well to reduce formulae size.
- Verified succesfully two real interlockings:
 - For all given safety conditions we either -
 - proved safety, or
 - returned counter example.
- Open problem (with no impact to practice?): Inclusion not reached, formulae still too big.

Future Work

- Remove functional dependencies: to reduce formulae size further.
- Look at modelling using First Order logic.
- Explore compositional reasoning of ladder logic templates used by Invensys.

Verification Within The Railway Domain	
Our Approach	
Real World Interlockings	Verification Results

Thanks!

Verification Within The Railway Domain Our Approach Real World Interlockings Verification Results

Automata Definition

Definition: Automaton

Given a ladder logic program P over $V = I \cup O \cup O'$. An automaton is a triple (S, I, \rightarrow) , where

•
$$S = \{\nu | \nu : I \cup U \to \{0, 1\}\}.$$

•
$$I = \{\nu' | \nu \models \neg I_{cond}, \nu \cup \nu' \models \psi_P\}$$

•
$$\nu \to \nu'$$
 iff $\nu \cup \nu' \models \psi_P$.